Virtue, Practice, and Perplexity in Plato’s m Wians – – Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society (Plato 12 ()). Dominic Scott has produced a monograph on the Meno that in its fluency and succinctness does justice to its subject and, like its subject. Buy [(Plato’s Meno)] [Author: Dominic Scott] published on (March, ) by Dominic Scott (ISBN:) from Amazon’s Book Store. Everyday low prices and free.
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Scott finds some fault, however, in stating that the speech displays “resentment”, on the basis of its warning to Socrates not to travel abroad Heffer, Originally Macmillan, Most notably, he dares to specify the views of the historical Socrates and vigorously defends the contention that the Meno predates the Gorgias. What Socrates does in that passage quoted by Scott on p. dominlc
Its treatment of these, though profound, is tantalisingly short, leaving the reader with many Scott thinks Meno reverses course in part in reaction to the example of Anytus. Meno remains the same bully now as before, and Socrates in effect warns us not to be taken in by his current turn to politeness and collegiality. Here, too, Scott is aware of the problem but simply asserts that we should not expect them to be the same .
What evidence does Scott provide to support his contention that the historical Socrates espoused such positions? That aside, why is plao a fault that Meno does not issue his challenge in stronger terms? Meno’s tentativeness suggests — accurately, I daresay — that the unitarian assumption is no easy thing to evaluate.
Dominic Scott: Plato’s Meno. – Free Online Library
His assumption may be plausible; but it is startling nonetheless that Scott offers, as far I can see, no grounds for it. The Meno of Plato R. Sccott being so, can we be certain that Socrates’ criticism of Meno is straightforwardly endorsed by Plato? Does not Meno declare that defining virtue is “easy,” thus making his definitions of it fair game for Socrates?
Indeed one wonders why Meno would ask the question in the first place in his “peremptory” plsto if not because he regards it as of pressing practical importance. Dominic Scott has produced a monograph on the Meno that in its fluency and succinctness does justice to its subject and, like its subject, makes for a reading experience that is both pleasurable and challenging. By “Socratic” here Scott is clear that he means what pertains to that elusive figure, the historical Socrates.
Does the demonstration not in fact suggest that, in the absence of a teacher who knows, recollection is insufficient to yield knowledge, yet that recollection is hardly needed at all if such a teacher scitt present? The assumption that we should determine what virtue is before asking whether it is teachable is not made the subject of a serious philosophical challenge either. Meno in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy categorize this paper.
The scotr value of Scott’s book lies in the stimulating questions it raises and in the often novel and always carefully supported ideas it advances. Irony and Insight in Plato’s Meno. Dancy – – Philosophy in Review 27 4: Scott has domiinc very much in this spirit, and I would like to focus here on two related aspects of the way he sees continuity within the dialogue.
We require a Meno with enough about him to suggest material that sophisticates doimnic engage with, but not enough to suggest that he belongs with them. They are not, however, instrumental.
But even if Meno’s moral character remains unchanged, has he not perhaps become a better pupil? These scoyt have been mostly critical. Meno in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. The following are some questions that would need to be answered before we could quite so sanguinely take at face value Socrates’ recollection theory and its implicit “foreknowledge” assumption.
The Meno then turns out to be yet another instance in which we are shown that Socrates, no matter how hard he tries to improve his interlocutor, fails time and again. In the case of elenchus scktt beneficial procedure, it is likewise a stretch to classify Meno’s stingray speech as a serious philosophical challenge, wonderfully vivid though it is in pronouncing that the effects of elenchus can feel far from positive.
If, however, the determination of what is philosophical begins with Socrates, with the life of inquiry and examination that he led, a life animated by questions and conducted through dialogue, can we be sure that philosophy excludes the employment of intentionally flawed arguments?
Edited with Introduction and Commentary. Dancy Florida State University.
Whereas Scott suggests that all Socrates is less than confident about is that he has provided sufficient support for recollection , it is surely surprising that, in the final analysis, Socrates affirms the moral value of inquiry as the only thing that has been established and that he would fight for in both word and deed [86b7-c3]. Scott contends that once Socrates takes up the question of virtue’s teachability, Meno shows signs of having improved: So let us look more closely at this aspect of his interpretation.
For the most part, therefore, Scott tacitly relies on the assumption that if the character Socrates expresses a view in certain favored Platonic dialogues, that is sufficient evidence for attributing said view to the historical figure. True, Socrates describes Meno as undisciplined in the speech that leads into his introduction of the method of hypothesis 86d3-e4, quoted by Scott on pp.